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Recent Decisions
One should not be permitted to benefit from an agreement, the- per-
formance of which is in direct violation of a significant state law,
unless compelling equities4 intervene to justify such enforcement.
Thomas M. Schultz
TORT-COMMON CARRIER-DUTY OF CARE-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has held that a common carrier is not the guardian of its
passengers' financial interests and thus has no duty to secure the name
and license number of individuals involved in traffic accidents with cabs
when the cab driver in no way caused the accident.
Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 260 A.2d 512 (1970).
The plaintiff was a passenger in a taxicab operated by the defendant
when it was struck in the rear by another vehicle. The taxicab was not
moving at the time of the accident and there is no claim that the
accident was, in any way, caused by the actions of the cab driver. It
appears from the facts that, immediately after the accident, the cab
driver approached the driver of the other Vehicle, spoke with him, but
did not secure his name or license number before the unknown driver
left the scene of the accident. Plaintiff's theory was that the taxicab
driver owed her a duty to secure this information, and that his failure
to do so constituted a breach of the duty a carrier owes to its passenger,
and therefore, it should be liable for her injuries since this breach
deprived her of an action against the hit-and-run driver for these in-
juries.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County held that the car-
rier owed no duty to the passenger to investigate the facts of the acci-
dent so as to aid the passenger in possible future litigation, and
therefore, sustained the defendant's preliminary objection. This deci-
sion was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' Justice
43. In Simms v. Simms, 31 Misc. 2d 882, 884, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
16 App. Div. 2d 806 (1961), the annulment decision, the court found that the parties
were aware of the existing relationship. In confronting the defendant's (petitioner in the
instant case) allegation of fraud the court stated that the testator's alleged representations
were ones of law and therefore not sufficient to maintain an action for fraud. However,
the court did admit that the allegations were sufficient to establish a confidential rela-
tionship, but the instant court made no mention of this its opinion.
I. Stupka. v. Peoples Cab Company,,437 Pa. 509, 260 A.2d 759 .(1970). -
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Cohen,2 speaking for the majority, ruled that the cab company does
have a duty to protect its passengers physical well-being "even when
the injury is no fault of the carrier's." The court stated however that
"[t]he interest in the passenger's financial well-being . . . seems of a
much lesser magnitude and not of sufficient weight to overcome the
traditional judicial reluctance to impose affirmative duties."3 The court
reasoned that the imposition of a duty in this case would be "a step
towards making a common carrier the guardian of all its passengers'
interests .... -4
The issue presented by this case is whether or not a common carrier
owes a duty to its passengers to prevent not only physical harm but
also financial harm resulting from the actions of a third party. In re-
solving this question the court first turned to the Restatement which
states that
[a] common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reason-
able action (a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical
harm, and (b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason
to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until
they can be cared for by others.5
The legal duty imposed by the Restatement has been applied only
in cases involving a passenger's well-being and is applicable whether
or not the injury was caused by the carrier. The court would not im-
pose a duty based on this section since we are concerned with a pas-
senger's financial interests in the instant case.
Since we have no cases in Pennsylvania supporting the plaintiff's con-
tention does this mean she is not entitled to damages? The answer to
this question can only be obtained by determining what duty a carrier
owes to its passengers. "While a carrier is not bound to anticipate
unusual and unexpected perils to its passengers . . . yet its servants
must be diligent at all times in protecting passengers from danger by
the exercise of the highest degree of care which is reasonably prac-
ticable." Is it "unusual and unexpected" that a driver involved in an
accident will leave the scene of the accident never to be heard from
2. Justice Jones filed a concurring opinion. Justice O'Brien filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Roberts joined.
3. Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 513, 260 A.2d 759, 761 (1970).
4. Id. at 512, A.2d at 761.
5. RESTATEMEr (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 314A (1965); Case law supports this position. Yazoo
and M.V.R.R. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906); Korn v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
108 Ga. App. 510, 133 S.E.2d 616 (1963).
6. Mack v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 247 Pa. 598, 602, 93 A. 618, 619 (1915).
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again? The "high degree of care" owed by a carrier to its passengers
is espoused in many cases. Although they all involve physical injuries
they do not necessarily exclude a situation as in this case.7
The majority felt that, at most, the defendant had a moral obligation
to act; there was no affirmative duty. "Common law courts have been
reluctant to impose affirmative duties on individuals even in situations
in which most people would feel under a moral obligation to act." s
The Restatement supports this position9 as does Yania v. Bigan in
which the court states:
Lastly, it is urged that Bigan failed to take the necessary steps
to rescue Yania from the water. The mere fact that Bigan saw Yania
in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal,
although a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue unless
Bigan was legally responsible, in whole or in part, for placing Yania
in the perilous position.' 0
The court attributed this stand to the" 'rugged individualism' approach
of the common law and 'the feeling that it is a more serious restraint
on personal freedom to require a person to act than it is to place limits
on his liberty to act.' "11
The distinction made between a moral and a legal duty may have
been unnecessary in this case. Perhaps the Motor Vehicle Code imposes
a legal duty where normally a moral duty would exist. The Motor
Vehicle Code requires the operator of any motor vehicle involved in
an accident resulting in bodily injury, to furnish a report of the acci-
dent to the Department of Motor Vehicles, upon forms furnished by
the department. 12 These forms require the identity of the operators
to be supplied. The statute creates a duty and failure to comply with
the statute may result in a fine of $10 or 10 days in jail. Is this duty
owed only to the Commonwealth or does it also extend to individuals?
If this duty is owed to individuals then the inquiry need go no
further. The defendant would be liable for plaintiff's injuries since
its employee failed to comply with the statute. Justice Cohen, however,
7. Brown v. Ambridge Yellow Cab Co., 374 Pa. 208, 97 A.2d 377 (1953).
8. Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 511, 260 A.2d 759, 760 (1970).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). It provides: "The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."
10. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 321, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959).
11. Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 511, 260 A.2d 759, 761 (1970); See
generally H. McNeice & J. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Torts, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1217 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
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felt this solution would be imposing a stiffer penalty for noncompliance
than the statute calls for since the defendant would be liable not just
for the nominal fine of $10, but the total amount of damages suffered
by the plaintiff.18
An alternative to this statutorily created duty would involve formu-
lating a guideline as an aid in defining the scope of duty. This very
approach was attempted as far back as 1883, in the case of Heaven v.
Pender.1 4 Brett's dictum states that
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a posi-
tion with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who
did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary
care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances
he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger.' 5
It would appear that this test does not make a distinction between
physical and financial well-being and both would be protected. As Jus-
tice O'Brien, dissenting in Stupka, points out "[t]he law has striven,
through damages for pain and suffering, to equate physical and financial
well-being." 0
In the instant case the court concluded that often "[a]n individual's
financial interests can be so complex and varied that we should not
require the carrier to be cognizant of them and responsible for fur-
thering and protecting them." The result of this is that plaintiff is
denied recovery because her financial, and not her physical well-being
was aggravated by the defendant's failure to act.
Paul F. Barchie
13. Stupka v. Peoples Cab Company, 437 Pa. 509, 513 & n.2, 260 A.2d 759, 761 & n.2
(1970).
14. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
15. Id. at 509. Some authors feel that this principle was denied by Brett when he
became Lord Esher. C. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings And The Duty of Care, 1
DEPAUL L.R. 30, 47. However, upon a reading of the case in which the supposed denial
took place, it a ppears that the .principle, would still apply in personal injury cases.
LeLievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491 (1893).
16; 437 Pa. at 517 n.1, 260-A.2d at 762 n.l.
17. Id. at 513, A.2d at 762.
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